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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
U.C.A 78-2a-3(2)(1953 as amended) states as follows: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
This Appeal is taken from a conviction of Appellant of a Class B Misdemeanor in the 
Fourtl: DiMiic! Coint Provo Department, Judge Gar) D Stott presiding. 
ISSUES PRESEN I ED F OR * VPPE, i.L 
i •'•'•-! the prosecution have a duty to provide Defendant with a list of all witnesses prior 
to trial? I his is a question ot law subject to de novo review 1 . • ui, »• -.ppca-
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (1994). This issue was raised as an objection at 
trial (Trial Transcript, pages 62-66)(Transcripts are in the companion case of Provo City v. Joan 
Pattc i i ( "oi li t ( >t , Vppe a ls C ase No. 970490-C \ ) ai n J in i Defei idai it s IV h i t i o i i foi f Jew Ti i.a. 1 ai id 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment (Trial Record Index, pages 31-33). 
ill I Jul the I'nal Court error in overruling i ^McmuM. -. u-
surprise testimony of Roger Gonzales, and in denying Defendant's post-trial motions so prejudice 
Defendant's case as to undermine confidence in its validity and warrant reversa1 a 
jliM ^ JXV j^ y | j i e Q0UTt of Appeals for correctness. State v. Pena, 
869 P 2d 932, 936 (1994). This issue was raised as an objection at trial (Trial Transcript, pages 
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62-66) and in Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Motion for Arrest of Judgment (Trial 
Record Index, pages 31-33). 
RELEVANT STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
1. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, 
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just 
under the circumstances. 
2. Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
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Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
3. Sectii :H: i 1' \.': i 4.080(3): 
No trash, used materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, scrap material, 
equipment or parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. 
S I A I EMEN I OF I i IE CASE 
Defendant Bill Patton and co-defendant, Joan Patton, were served with summons on May 
31 1.996,, charging that on March 1( ), 1996., both defendants ;.: .i-.iiKK ic. -AKVMA! 
vehicles, or miscellaneous materials in their yard, in violation of Provo City Ordinance 14.34.080. 
'Ti ial Index, pages 2-4) Arraignment was held on December 4, 1996, in the Fourth District 
•
 1
- * - - . i ^ 5-7 : ; I": Miscript pages l-
) d\\.' Pretrial was held before Judge Howard on lanuarv 30. Iu07 (Pretrial Transcript, pages 
. .: was held on. May 19, 199 7,, befoi e Hoi l. Gai y D. Stott at id iefendai its wei e 
comicLed of violating the ordinance, a Class B Misdemeanor. The court disregarded all evidence 
as to abandoned, wrecked or junked vehicles, but specifically found that defendants had other 
>••'"• ' -•-• ' "»•'» t-110, i_- s^-fencing was held before 
Judge Stott tin lune 23, 1997, at which time both defendants presented Motions for New Trials 
and i 4c tioi is fc i \,i i: est of In ldgi net it. ( I i ial Index, pages 3 1-33: Sentencing I ransci ipt pages 1-
7). I hese motions were denied on August 4, 1997. (Trial Index, page 42). Notice of Appeal 
was timely filed. (Trial Index, pages 41, 61, 66). 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
Extensive discovery was conducted prior to trial by the defendants. Beginning at 
arraignment and continuing throughout preparation for trial, Defendant was told by the city 
attorney that Defendant would be provided with all information in the prosecutor's file. 
(Transcript of Arraignment Hearing, page 5). At Pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, 
assured the Court and Defendant's counsel that all matters in the city's file would be provided to 
the defendants. At that time the city's main witness, Anthony Malloy, in the presence of Mr. 
McGinn, told the defendants and counsel that he would be the only witness for the city, and that 
he had taken all relevant photos. Malloy had also made written statements to Mr. McGinn, prior 
to the filing of the complaint stating that he, Malloy, had taken all relevant photos. (Transcript of 
Sentencing Hearing, page 3). This document was provided to defendants in the course of 
discovery. Defendant prepared his defense based upon a thorough inspection of the city 
attorney's file, and on the statements made by both the city attorney and Mr. Malloy. In none of 
the materials received by Defendants prior to trial and in no conversations with either the city's 
attorneys nor Mr. Malloy was the Appellant ever informed that the City intended to call a Roger 
Gonzales as a witness. (Trial Transcript, pages 64-65). 
At trial on May 19, 1997, contrary to his prior written and verbal statements, Mr. Malloy 
stated that Roger Gonzales had taken the relevant photos that the city submitted as evidence. 
(Trial Transcript, page 14). The city then proceeded to call Roger Gonzales as a witness. 
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Appellant objected to the admission of Mr. Gonzales1 testimony inasmuch as they were entirely 
unprepared to cross-examine him. on any matter, having relied on the City s representations 
(Ciian)niL' tin i nuieritN of (he City's file and the source of the photos. Appellant's objection was 
overruled upon the court's finding that Appellant had not filed an explicit written request for a list 
of witnesses.,, ( l M "I l ' I«IM npt paues ^ l-(Wi) I I i lonzales was the sole witness able to testify 
as to any specific items in the Appellant's yard that might have constituted garbage on March 19, 
1996. (Tr'^\ Transcript, pages 68-74),, It i ruling against the /\ppci . 
linn!)'. ':rm evidence as to any matter testified to by Mr. Malloy and also as to any matter alleged 
to be shown in the photos, but specifically found that there was garbage in the yard oii Maich 19, 
19%. 
At sentencing on Juru- 2 ; ! 997, Appellant presented a Motion for Arrest of Judgment and 
a Motion for New Trial,, based on tnc tourt's error in adinitliiit", (lit* testimony ot Mi (lon/iilcs 
Both Motions were ultimately denied on August 4, 1997. (Trial Index, page 42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
.. ..-. . ..>i,::-.: .; v,-i;:;on has an affirmative duty to provide the 
defense with any inculpatory evidence prior to trial, including any witnesses the prosecution 
intends to can i IK;-; HICH - uno-- • s -.j :*>rm.- ,u. . :f.c 
request. The prosecution also has a duty not to mislead the defense In this case, Provo City 
failed to provide the Defendant, William Patton, with a list of witnesses and made several writteiI 
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and verbal representations that misled the defense into believing that Anthony Malloy would be 
the city's sole witness. This constituted error on the city's part, compounded when the court 
erroneously ruled that the city had no duty to provide the defense with a witness list. 
II. Defendant timely objected to allowing the surprise witness, Roger Gonzales, to testify 
at trial, and repeated those objections in post-trial motions. Inasmuch as the prosecution had 
erred in failing to notify the defense of its intent to call Mr. Gonzales, the court erred under Rule 
16(g) and Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in failing to exclude Mr. Gonzales 
testimony and failing to grant Defendant's post-trial motions. The court's error in admitting Mr 
Gonzales' surprise testimony completely prejudiced Defendant's case. Defendant was unable to 
prepare to meet the testimony. The evidence is ample that the defendants thoroughly prepared for 
such evidence as they were apprised of in discovery. The entire conviction was based solely on 
the testimony of the surprise witness. The court therefore erred in admitting this testimony, and 
further erred in refusing to grant a new trial or arrest of judgment. The error was thus sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the validity of the proceeding and provides ample cause for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PROSECUTION HAD A DUTY TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH A LIST OF 
ALL ANTICIPATED WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Discovery in a criminal case is governed by Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which states in pertinent part as follows: 
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(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense, (emphasis added) 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, 
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
In a case such as Defendant's, where the specific evidence requested does not fit any of 
the detailed descriptions in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4), which mandate disclosure upon 
request, subsection (a)(5), the catch all provision, applies. While the wording of subsection (a)(5) 
might suggest that it requires disclosure of the material sought only to the extent ordered by the 
court, the law is clearly established that when the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a 
request under subsection (a)(5) without requiring the defense to obtain a court order, the 
prosecution cannot respond in a manner that it is misleading. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 
(Utah 1987). In fact, the aspect of "good cause . . . which the court determines" applies only in 
cases where the prosecution explicitly refuses to provide discovery and the defense must compel 
discovery by order of the court. Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 
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1993). This duty to provide discovery is ongoing. State v. Carter 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985); State v.Knmht 734P.2d913, 917 (Utah 1987); State v. Betgishe, 937P.2d527, 530 
(Utah App. 1997); Rule 16(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure. This is especially so when discovery 
is voluntary. State v. Kalliiu 877 P.2d 138, 142 (Utah 1994). 
When discovery is voluntary, the prosecution has an affirmative duty not to mislead the 
defense, and specifically to provide inculpatory evidence. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 532. In 
Beuishe the defense's opening statement at trial, based on pre-trial discovery, was that the 
prosecution had no tangible evidence linking the defendant to the alleged rape of a child. After 
the trial had begun, the prosecutor attempted to discredit this statement by sending the alleged 
victim's panties to the crime lab for additional testing. The defendant's only opportunity to 
counter the evidence was through frantic efforts between trial sessions. 937 P.2d at 529. In Salt 
Lake City v. Reynolds, the city failed to completely respond to the defendant's discovery request, 
but also failed to inform the defense that it was refusing to provide all requested information. The 
defense did not attempt to compel discovery because the prosecution's conduct had misled them 
to believe they had no reason to do so. 849 P.2d at 585. In State v. Knight, the prosecution 
offered to provide all discovery voluntarily under an "open file" policy. The defense specifically 
inquired as to certain witnesses and was repeatedly assured that they would not be called at trial. 
Nevertheless, on the day of trial, those witnesses were called. The defense had no opportunity to 
prepare and was misled into preparing a trial strategy different from what the situation demanded. 
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734 P.2d at 916. This is particularly parallel to the situation in the present case. At arraignment, 
the prosecution declared that it would provide all discovery materials to the defendants. 
(Arraignment transcript, page 5). At pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, reaffirmed his 
intention to provide the defense with all materials in the file (Sentencing transcript, pages 3-5), 
and at trial he was adamant that he had done so. (Trial transcript, page 64). The discovery 
materials provided to both defendants contained no witness list whatsoever. They did, however, 
contain a memorandum from the city inspector, Anthony Malloy, to Mr. McGinn stating that 
Malloy had taken all the relevant photos. Consistent with this document, and in response to the 
direct question at pretrial of both Mrs. Patton and Mr.Humiston as to who the city's witnesses 
would be, both Mr. Malloy and Mr. McGinn clearly represented that Mr. Malloy would be the 
only witness. (Sentencing transcript, pages 3-5). The defense thus had no indication that any 
other witnesses would be called and no reason to inquire any further. 
While the defense has a duty to pursue discovery diligently (State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 
143 [Utah 1994]), an inadequate response by the prosecution will logically lead the defense to 
infer that there is no further information. Salt Lake v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d at 582. 
When Roger Gonzales was presented as a witness at trial, both defendants objected 
vehemently. (Trial transcript, pages 62-66). The court ruled, however, that the city had no 
obligation to notify the defense of the city's intention to call Mr. Gonzales, as the record 
contained no specific request for witnesses. (Trial transcript, pages 65-66). As is clear from 
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Knight and the numerous related cases, there was no need for a specific request for a witness list, 
and the prosecution had a positive duty not to mislead the defense. The court's ruling was thus 
clearly incorrect, and the conduct of the prosecution was improper. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN ADMITTING GONZALES' SURPRISE TESTIMONY 
SO PREJUDICED DEFENDANTS CASE AS TO UNDERMINE ALL CONFIDENCE IN 
THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL AND WARRANTS REVERSAL. 
The court broad discretion in remedying abuses of discovery. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (1994). Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just 
under the circumstances. 
However, the "effective administration of justice requires that discoverable evidence be 
provided much sooner than 'moments' before trial." State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 532. 
Rule 30(a) provides: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
When it is clear, as it is here, that the defense had exercised all reasonable diligence in 
discovery and properly preserved all objections, the two questions the court must answer are 
whether admission of the surprise testimony was error, and whether that error was prejudicial. 
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State v Knight, 734 P 2d at 916 It has already been clearly established that allowing the 
testimony was error, and the sole question remaining is whether that error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal State v Carter, 707 P 2d 656, 662 (1985) 
An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, the 
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at trial Knight, 734 P 2d at 919 A 
"reasonable likelihood" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
trial Horrell v Utah Farm Bureau Ins Co , 909 P 2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App 1996) The 
quantum of probability required to undermine confidence falls far short of "more probable than 
nor Knight, 734 P 2d at 920 State v Jacques, 924 P 2d 898, 902 (Utah App 1996) Indeed, 
when the defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to show that the error was harmless 
Knight, 734 P 2d at 921, State v Bell, 770 P 2d 100 (Utah 1988) 
In Defendant's case, it is clear that Gonzales' testimony was severely prejudicial Three 
witnesses testified at trial Anthony Malloy, Roger Gonzales, and Brent Keller The bulk of Mr 
Malloy's testimony regarded abandoned and junked vehicles (Trial Transcript, pages 26 through 
56) As a result of discovery, the defendants had opportunity to prepare for this testimony, as is 
clear from the extensive questions asked by Mrs Patton Id. As a result, the court rejected 
virtually all of Mr Malloy's testimony, and specifically found that there was insufficient evidence 
on the issue of junked vehicles (Trial transcript, pages 114-115) While Mr Malloy did testify 
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vaguely as to "junk" in the yard, upon repeated cross-examination he could not specify what that 
"junk" consisted of. (Trial transcript, pages 24, 44-45, 62) Indeed, he openly stated, "I do not 
recall specifics", Id. at 24, and "I do not recall specifically what was in the front yard area", Id. at 
62. Mr. Keller did not testify as to any items in the Patton's yard. Id. at 87-99. Mr. Gonzales, 
however, testified very specifically as to "wood and lumber scraps" in the yard. Id. at 68-74. He 
also testified, contrary to the written and verbal statements provided in discovery, that he had 
taken all the relevant photographs. Id. at 67-68. 
In contrast to the examination of Mr. Malloy, Mrs. Patton was completely unprepared to 
ask Mr. Gonzales any questions, as the court specifically noted. (Trial transcript, pages 70-71, 
Mr. Humiston: lTm going to question him on behalf of Mrs. Patton, but I guess she doesn't have 
any questions prepared because we did not know about this witness1', The Court: "I want the 
record to reflect that"). Mr. Humiston examined Mr. Gonzales as best he could, being equally 
unprepared. Id., pages 71-74. It is significant that in the end the court found the testimony 
regarding junked vehicles, which was the bulk of Mr. Malloy's testimony, inconclusive. Id. page 
114. It also disregarded all of the photographs. Id. pages 114-115. The court found only that 
there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and this was a matter that only Mr. Gonzales 
had testified to. Id., pages 115-116. The court was very specific in limiting its finding to the 
trash. Id. pages 120-121 
-12-
Had the defense had any notice whatsoever of the city's intention to call Mr. Gonzales, it 
could have adequately prepared to address his testimony. Unfortunately, none of the matters on 
which Mr. Gonzales would have been questioned appear in the record, as the defense did not have 
that opportunity. If the nature of an error prevents the court from clearly determining the effect 
of the error, the burden is upon the prosecution to show that the error was harmless. State v. 
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988). Clearly, the city cannot do so in this case. 
In determining whether a witness' testimony is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, a 
number of factors must be considered: 
1. The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case; 
2. Whether the testimony is cumulative; 
3. The presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony; 
4. The extent of cross-examination; and 
5. The overall strength of the case. 
State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 
(1987) 
It is clear that Mr. Gonzales' testimony was crucial to the city's case. There was no 
specific testimony regarding trash other than his testimony, and virtually no corroborating 
evidence. Cross-examination was limited by the element of surprise, and all other evidence other 
than Mr. Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge. 
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It is thus clear that the court erred in allowing Mr. Gonzales to testify, and that error 
requires reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed error in permitting the city's surprise witness, Roger Gonzales, 
to testify. This error so prejudiced Defendant's case as to undermine all confidence in the 
outcome of the trial, as there is a high likelihood that but for this error, Defendant would have 
prevailed at trial. Defendant William Patton's conviction of violating Provo City Ordinance 
14.34.080 should therefore be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 2nd day of February 1998 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Appellant William Patton 
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MR. R0MNEY: Your Honor, actually it's Mr. 
McGinn's case. He handles the zoning portion matters, 
but I don't think very long. 
THE COURT: Is that going to be adequate 
time with that pre-trial? Could it be mailed to them? 
MR. ROMNEY: Sure. I'll just ask Mr. McGinn 
to send them discovery. We know the address. 
THE COURT: Would that be adequate, Ms. 
Patton? I'll have them mail you a copy of the 
materials they have, and I think they can get that 
done before this date. And then we'll come back on 
the pre-trial conference date for further discussion. 
That would not be a trial date, that would just be a 
date to discuss the case to see what we can do about 
it. Would that be agreeable with you? 
MS. PATTON: Yes. May I also have it read 
into the record, then, that in the event that I choose 
to represent myself, may I speak for Mr. Patton as 
well? 
THE COURT: Ordinarily you may not, because 
that's a practice of law. But we'll see what we can 
do -- we may not get to that point, so let's see what 
can be done at the pre-trial, okay? 
MS. PATTON: All right. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Romney? 
12 
letter? 
A. The notice states the specific ordinances 
which they are in violation of, describes what will 
need to happen in order for compliance to be met, and 
I notified them on that that if they did not contact 
me within a specific time frame that the file would be 
forwarded to the city attorney's office for legal 
proceedings. 
Q. At that point what: did you do next? 
A. That was mailed March 11th. I did not 
receive a response, and on March 19, 1996 I went out 
to the site once again with another zoning officer, 
Roger Gonzalez, in order to take photos that would 
document the specific violation that I was preparing 
to send to your office --to the city attorney's 
office for legal proceedings. 
Q. And that was what date again? 
A. That was March 19th. March 20, 1996 I sent 
a letter to William and Joan Patton informing them 
thai: the file had been sent to the city attorney's 
office for legal action. 
I neglected -- I'm sorry, and can I add 
something? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I neglected to mention that 
14 
look at what's been marked as City's Exhibit No. l. 
Do you recognize that photo? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is that a photo of? 
A. This is a photo of the house that according 
to the Utah County Recorder's Office is owned by 
William and Joan Patton. 
Q. When was that photo taken? 
A. It was taken on March 19, 1996. 
Q. Who took that photo? 
A. Actually Roger Gonzalez took that photo. 
Q. Were you with him at the time that photo was 
taken? 
A. I was with him. 
Q. Does that photo accurately and fairly 
represent the state of the property on that date, 
March 19, 1996? 
A. It does. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, may I approach the 
witness again? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: I'm handing you what's been 
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. What is that? 
A. This is another photo of the property owned 
by William and Joan Patton, taken March 19, 1996. 
26 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Malloy, what vehicles are in violation 
of the ordinance? 
A. Specifically on that date? On the subject 
lot that we're discussing today there is a trailer 
parked in the front yard area that is, in my opinion, 
was inoperable, and violates Section 14-34-080. 
Q. And that's the only vehicle that you find in 
violation? 
A. On this lot at this time, that is correct. 
THE COURT: When you say, "this time," whac 
time frame are you talking about? 
THE WITNESS: I believe we're addressing 
March 19th, is that right, or are we discussing today? 
THE COURT: No, that's correct. That should 
be the date you're speaking of. 
THE WITNESS: It was. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Is the vehicle wrecked? 
A. In my opinion it was inoperable and 
unlicensed. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
or an unlicensed vehicle (inaudible) city code? 
A. I'm not sure if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
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in the state code? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
in the policy and procedure of -- for your department? 
A. In Section 14-34-080 it does describe 
certain vehicles that would be considered a violation 
of that section of the ordinance. 
Q. (Inaudible). 
A. 14-34-080. 
Q. Did you check to see if there was an 
accident report filed on this vehicle? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Do you know if there's an accident report on 
file for this vehicle? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Was there a report from a garage or a body 
shop that this vehicle was in for repairs and did not 
have a accident damage sticker? 
A. I do not recall if I received any. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether the vehicle was wrecked? 
A. I do not believe so. If it's inoperable 
that is evident --it has flat tires that are on the 
vehicle for a period of one year or several months, 
then I would say it pretty well indicates that it's 
n 
j inoperable. If it's unlicensed -- if it's licensed 
then there should be tags on the vehicle showing that: 
it is licensed. 
Q. Is there an occasion for one zoning officer 
when they find a vehicle wrecked (inaudible) another, 
both find the same vehicle to (inaudible) is there an 
occasion where one zoning officer may find a vehicle 
wrecked while another will not find the same vehicle 
to be wrecked? 
A. I can only account through how I would 
visually see it, but I can't answer for somebody else. 
Q. Is the vehicle junked? 
A. I would say it's inoperable. 
Q. Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in 
the city code? 
A. I do not know if there is. 
Q. Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in 
the scate code? 
A. I do not know if there is. 
Q. Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in 
your department's policy and procedure? 
A. I do not know if there is other than what is 
described in Section 14-34-080. 
Q. Does faded paint make a vehicle a junk 
vehicle? 
A. 
Q. 
Alone t 
Does a 
junked vehicle? 
wha t 
A. 
was 
Q. 
ihey may 
missing 
I guess it wouJ 
missing 
Does a 
not be a 
molding 
.d depend 
dingy look make 
viola 
make a 
upon 
a vehi 
tion. 
vehicle a 
hew extensive 
cle a junk 
vehicle? 
A. I would say no. 
Q. Does someching have to be unusable to be 
junked? 
A. According to this section of the ordinance 
when describing vehicles, it does nou just reference 
junked vehicles, it says inoperative, dismantled, 
partially dismantled, unlicensed, et cetera. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether the vehicle is junked? 
A. If I'm assessing whether or not it's 
inoperable or junked, then I would say, yes, it is 
subjective to an extent. But if it's inoperable then 
it would be obvious to me or other people I would 
imagine. But once again, I cannot answer how somebody 
else would see something. 
Q. Is there an occasion where one zoning office 
may find a vehicle junked while another will not find 
the same vehicle to be junked? 
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A. I think I answered that, and I couldn't 
ansv/er how somebody else would see something. 
Q. Is the vehicle partially dismantled? 
A. Is the vehicle partially dismantled? 
Q. The trailer we're talking about. 
A. I cannot see what's in the back of the 
trailer. When we were just meeting on Friday I did 
point out, too, that the vehicle was -- well, last 
Monday that it wasn't -- did not: have tags that I 
could see showing it was licensed, and it did net have 
tires that -- you know, that they could be used, it 
had flat tires. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in the city code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in the state code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in your department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Did you verify that this vehicle was 
dismantled in accordance with the state code? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you verify that there was a license to 
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dismantle, as required by state code? 
A. I did not. What I filed on (inaudible) was 
a violation of Section 14-34-080, which would include 
not only that the vehicle is dismantled, but also that 
it is inoperative, not licensed. Any one of those 
issues would be a violation of that section of the 
ordinance, and require the vehicle to either be moved 
off the lot or placed behind the fence or in a 
building, not in the front yard set back. 
Q. Did you inform public safety officers or the 
prosecutor attempting to dismantle a vehicle without 
proper license may be violated? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Can a vehicle be operable and partially 
dismantled? 
A. With this specific vehicle I would say that 
it would be hard to operate it with flat tires. 
Q. How many flat tires did you see? 
A. I believe I -- if I recall correctly there 
were two. 
Q. Did you verify whether the Pattons were 
operating this vehicle? 
A. Prior to March 19th or as of this date, no, 
I did not. 
Q. As of this date. 
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A. I did not. I had not received any personal 
contact with you at that point in time, nor had I 
tried to initiate physical contact because of the sign 
that is posted on your property that informs agents --
that informs local agencies and representatives to not 
enter your property. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer, such as yourself, as to whether the vehicle 
is partially dismantled? 
A. I would say that in part that may be the 
fact, but again, it would be quite objective as far as 
being able to see visually whether it is dismantled or 
not. 
Q. Is the vehicle inoperable? 
A. I would say, yes, it is. 
Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in the 
city code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
19 Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in the 
20 state code? 
21 A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
22 Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in your 
23 department's policy and procedure? 
24 A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
25 I Q. Are you aware of whether or not Provo City 
has adopted certain state codes into the city code in 
their entirety? 
A. I'm not sure whether they have or not. 
Q. Are you familiar with this book? 
A. I am. 
MS. PATTON: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Would you please identify 
ard read the first marked passage on the following 
page, 942, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 
Adopted," please, right there. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, objection, 
relevancy. I'm not following the relevancy of this. 
THE COURT: You're asking him to read--
MS. PATTON: Just one paragraph, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And cite again what you're 
asking him to read. 
MS. PATTON: I'm asking him to read on page 
942-010, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 
Adopted." 
THE COURT: That is not 14-34-080? 
MS. PATTON: No, it is not. 
THE COURT: Would you address, please, the 
objection with respect to relevancy then? Ms. Patton, 
the objection on relevancy. 
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MS. PATTON: If you'll just give me a little 
leeway, your Honor, I can tie all this in. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll give you all the 
leeway that you need, but you'll comply with the rules 
just like Mr. Humiston has to comply with them. And 
we have an objection to the question on relevancy, and 
I'm asking you to demonstrate and tell me why it's 
relevant, and if it's not relevant he doesn't have to 
answer it. If it is relevant he does have to answer 
it. 
MS. PATTON: According to my perception, 
which may not always be good, your Honor, it's my 
understanding that Provo City adopted this ordinance 
into their code from the State. 
THE COURT: Read what she's asked you to 
read. 
THE WITNESS: The title for this section is 
"Police Ordinances, Provisions of the Motor Vehicle 
Act Adopted." Should I proceed to read the--
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Just only that which is 
marked. There's just one little -- right there, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Has he read what you've asked 
him to read? 
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to read it all? 
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THE COURT: The question--
MS. PATTON: Just what's underlined. 
THE WITNESS: Just what's underlined? 
THE COURT: The question to you is to read 
whatever she's asked you to read. I deny the 
objection. Go ahead and read what she's asked you to 
read. 
THE WITNESS: "The Motor Vehicle Act, 
Chapter 1 of Title 41, Utah Code as amended is hereby 
adopted as a Provo City Ordinance." 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Mr. Malloy, are you familiar 
with this book? 
A. Somewhat familiar. 
MR. HUMISTON: State for the record that 
she's identified the Utah Code, I believe Section 41. 
THE COURT: Well, she hasn't identified 
anything yet other than the book in her hand. 
MS. PATTON: I just want to know if he 
recognized the book. It is the Utah Code Annotated 
Volume II, for the record. 
May I approach again, please 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Mr. Malloy, would you please 
identify and read the first marked passage on the 
following page, 41-1A-1009. 
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MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, could I have a 
moment to get there myself? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. State it again, will 
you please, Ms. Patton? 
MS. PATTON: 41-1A-1CC9. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. Do you have it? 
THE WITNESS: I do. "Abandoned and 
inoperable vehicles, vessels and outboard motors 
determination by commission disposal of vehicles. 1, 
a vehicle vessel or outboard mccor is abandoned and 
inoperable when a) the vehicle, vessel or outboard 
motor has been inspected by an authorized investigator 
or agent appointed by the commission, and b) the 
authorized investigator or agent has made a written 
determination that the vehicle, vessel or outboard 
motor cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed in a manner 
that allows its use as designed by the manufacturer." 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Are ycu an authorized 
investigator or agent of the state tax commission? 
A. I am not. 
Q. Was the determination of inoperability made 
in accordance with that state code? 
A. This state code references specifically 
abandoned and inoperable vehicles. Section 14-34-08 0 
goes beyond only referencing abandoned and/or 
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inoperable vehicles. So you were cited for the 
violation of Section 14-34-080, which in my opinion, 
includes other areas than just being abandoned or 
inoperable. 
Q. So you're saying that the city code 
overrides the state code; is that what I'm hearing you 
say? 
A. What I'm saying is what I specifically cited 
you for the violation of. If you're asking for an 
interpretation of what the City's policy is, I cannot 
answer that. 
Q. Does the City have a written policy for--
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Has there been a request for the 
determination of inoperability under that state code 
that you--
A. As far as I'm aware there has not been. 
Q. With no other definition of inoperable, has 
this vehicle been determined to be inoperable by 
you --by yourself? 
A. In my opinion, yes, it is inoperable. 
Q. Did you ever ask the Pattons if the vehicle 
was operable? 
A. As I've expressed to you, prior to this dace 
I was not in a position to speak with you, nor had I 
3 3 
1 received any response from you to the letters that I 
2 had sent to you in order to ask you in regards to that 
3 specific question. 
4 Q. Is the vehicle abandoned? 
5 A. I would say it's more than likely not 
6 abandoned. 
7 Q. So your answer is no? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Is the vehicle licensed? 
10 A. I could not see anything that would 
11 reference it as being licensed. 
12 Q. Does the ordinance make a distinction 
13 between licensed and unlicensed vehicles, or are they 
14 dealt with in this same manner? 
15 A. They are not dealt with in this same manner. 
16 If the vehicle is unlicensed then according to this 
17 section of ordinance 14-34-080 on a residential lot a 
18 ! maximum of two vehicles may be maintained, but each 
19 vehicle must be either within a building or behind an 
20 opaque screening fence. If the vehicle is operable 
21 and licensed then the owner of the property is 
22 required to provide legal parking for that and all 
23 I other operable vehicles that they own, or tenants own. 
24 Q. Is the term "opaque" defined in the Provo 
25 City code? 
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A. I'm not aware of whether or not opaque is 
defined. 
Q. Is the term "opaque" defined in the state 
code? 
A. I'm not: aware of whether or not opaque is 
defined in the state code. 
Q. Is the term "opaque" defined in the policy 
and procedure? 
A. Is the what, sorry? 
Q. Excuse me. Is the term "opaque" defined in 
the city policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Are opaque and sight obscuring the same 
thing? 
A. I would say that they are. 
Q. Does the Provo City code give a height 
requirement for an opaque screening fence? 
A. It does. 
Q. Does your department's policy and procedure 
give a height requirement for an opaque screening 
fence? 
A, It does. 
Q. Is non-sight obscuring defined as at least 
50 percent open? 
A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 
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Q. Yes, I surely could. Is non-sight obscuring 
defined as at least 50 percent open? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Is any fence less than 50 percent open 
considered to be sight obscuring? 
A. Is any fence less than 50 percent open 
considered sight obscuring? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Is there a fence between the vehicle and the 
public street? 
A. Between this specific vehicle? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There is -- well, there is a gate. 
Q. Is there a fence between the vehicle and the 
adjoining property? 
A. Is there a fence between this and the 
adjoining property? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I believe there is. 
Q. Is the fence sight obscuring? 
A. There are numerous fences that we need to 
address. If we're not going to address the other 
property, then how can I possibly describe the fences 
that would separate the properties? 
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Q. I am referring simply to that (inaudible). 
A. The fence that is along the front property 
line specifically in front of the vehicle, I believe, 
was intended to be sight obscuring. It's used as a 
gate, but over the years the fence has continued to 
dilapidate, and now as the photos depict, you can see 
that many of the slats in the chain link fence have 
either been moved or are in bad shape so that the 
fence itself more than likely would be -- the gate 
area more than likely would be 50 percent open. 
Q. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
position? I don't think this -- oh, maybe it will. 
Here we go. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
position when the zoning officers approved compliance 
during defendant's 1994 probation for zoning 
violations? 
A. I did not work for Provo City at that time, 
so I'm not aware. 
Q. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
condition as -- well, I'll ask this later. Would the 
City have had any (inaudible) authority and right 
under the probation to bring the property into 
compliance at defendants' expense had she not brought 
it into compliance? 
A. I'm sorry, I didn't follow the beginning 
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part of what you said. 
Q. Would the City have any enforced its 
authority and right under the probation to bring the 
property into compliance at defendants' expense had 
she not brought it into compliance? 
A. What probation? 
Q. Any probation. As an example, this type, if 
nothing was brought into compliance, then would the 
City enforce its right to say, "Take the trailer, take 
the fence down?" 
A. I believe that that is what we have 
requested of you to either move the vehicle to another 
place on the lot or remove it from the lot to comply 
with Section 14-34-080. 
Q. But the vehicle had been removed under 
(inaudible) defendants' last guilty verdict by the 
City if the vehicle was not in compliance at that 
time? 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, I don't have an 
objection, but I'm going to sustain it anyway. 
My objection is that we are not here to 
discuss matters of prior hearings and any rulings wich 
respect to whether there was a guilty or not guilty 
verdict, as you've characterized it. Please don't get 
into those. 
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Q. BY MS. PATTON: Has the standard for 
determining a vehicle's compliance changed between 
1994 and present? 
A. I did not work for Provo City in 1994, so I 
couldn't answer for that. In my opinion since I 
started with Provo City in November of 1995 it has not 
changed. 
Q. This is a 1996 (inaudible). 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So my question is, in 1994 has the 
compliance changed? Are you aware if the compliance 
has changed? 
A. I would need to reference the 1994 ordinance 
and compare them to today's ordinance to knov/ whether 
they have changed. 
Q. Is the property presently in violation of 
sub section 3 of the Provo City Ordinance in Count I? 
A. Could you show me a copy of that ordinance 
that we're referencing at this point? 
THE COURT: It's 14-34-080 Section 3? Is 
that what you're talking about? 
MS. PATTON: Uh-huh. 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE WITNESS: You said sub section 3? 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Yes. 
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A. Should I read that? 
Q. You're welcome to. 
A. "No trash, used materials, junk, household 
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or 
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The 
accumulation of more than one such item constitutes a 
junk yard as defined in Chapter 14-06, Provo City 
Code, and must be removed from the property, stored 
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in 
an M-2 zone." 
Because I have not been on the subject lot, 
I do not know what is in the backyard area. There is 
a sign, as I've described before, that prohibits me 
from going on the site to determine what is in the 
backyard. Because I have not been on the site nor 
seen what's in the backyard I cannot answer that 
adequately in response to your question. 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. I'm sorry, what's that? 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. As I just said, I cannot determine what's in 
the backyard area because I have not been--
Q. On what you have seen. 
A. In the front yard area I have not seen it as 
today's date. On March 19, 1996, however, there was 
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other materials that I referenced by sub section 3. 
There were materials in the yard area. 
Q. Does the yard have used materials in it? 
A. When? 
THE COURT: We're talking about 3/19/96? 
MS. PATTON: Uh-huh, that's correct. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, there were at that point 
in time materials in the front yard area. Again, I do 
not know what was in the backyard area. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Is the term "used material" 
defined in the Provo City Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
state code? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Does the term relate to items used in 
building structures? 
A. Does the term or does the ordinance? 
Q. Does the term (inaudible) the word material? 
A. It may well refer to materials used for 
construction. 
Q. Does the term relate to previously utilized 
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fabric? 
A. It may well reference that. 
Q. The ordinance has a term "used material" in 
a plural form in the ordinance violated if a singular 
used material is present. 
A. I'm sorry, I don't follow what you're 
saying. 
Q. It says, "used materials." Was there used 
materials upon that date? 
A. I would say, yes, there were. 
Q. Is it possible that the used materials that 
you alleged observed were in fact a trailer loaded 
with junk to be taken to a landfill? 
A. In the front yard area? 
Q. You have two pictures, correct? 
A. I do. 
Q. Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2? 
A. Uh-huh, that is correct. 
Q. There are some trailers that you've given 
testimony to? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay, my question then of those trailers, is 
it possible that the used materials that you allegedly 
observed were in fact a trailer loaded with junk to be 
taken to a landfill? 
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A. That material was present and you are 
correct, but there were other items in the yard area 
in addition to the materials in the trailers. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether things are used materials? 
A. In some ways I guess that it could be. 
Q. Does the yard have junk on it? 
A. It did. 
Q. Is the term ,fjunk" defined in the Provo Cicy 
Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "junk" defined in the Utah State 
Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "junk" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is it possible that the junk you observed 
was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the landfill 
at its earliest opportunity? 
A. Some materials were, as I said just a minute 
ago, but there were definitely other materials in the 
yard area that were not loaded into a trailer, and 
were not going to be moved at the earliest convenience 
to a site other than the residence. 
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I have no idea what your intentions were for 
the materials since you did not contact me in response 
to my letters, but we're talking about several months. 
I would imagine in that time you would have had an 
opportunity, if it was at your earliest convenience, 
to move those in a two month period. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether things are junk? 
A. In some ways it may be. 
Q. Does the property have household furniture 
on it? 
A. I do not recall specifically whecher there 
are household -- was household furniture on the lot. 
Q. Is lawn furniture considered to be household 
furniture? 
A. Lawn furniture, in my opinion, would not be 
characteristic of the same furniture you would use in 
your home. 
Q. Is outdoor furniture considered to be 
household furniture? 
A. No, it does not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
in the Provo City Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
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in the Utah State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
in the department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. And is it a subjective judgment by the 
zoning officer as to whether things are household 
furniture? 
A. Other than common sense of what is household 
furniture, then I would say that it is a subjective 
issue. 
Q. Does the property have appliances on it? 
A. On the lot or you mean in the yard area? 
Q. In the yard area. 
A. I have no idea what's in the backyard area, 
I have not: seen it. I do not recall specifically what 
was in the front yard area other than recalling that 
there were definitely items in violation of that 
section, Section 14-34-080 in the yard area, March 19, 
1996. Unfortunately I did net keep a log of specific 
items in the yard area on that date. 
Q. is it a yes or no answer to whether there's 
appliances on the property as far as what you could 
see? 
A. As far as what I could see I don't recall. 
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Q. Does the yard have scrap material on it? 
A. I would say yes, it did. 
Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
Provo City Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
Utah State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is it possible that your alleged scrap 
material was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the 
landfill at its earliest opportunity? 
A. I guess it is possible that some of the 
items on those trailers were scrap material, but there 
is still definitely other materials on the subject lot 
at that time. 
Q. Is it possible that your alleged scrap 
material was new material that hadn't been used yet? 
A. Some of it may have been that, but in my 
opinion, there were other items on the lot that were 
scrap material. 
Q. Is it the subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether things are scrap material? 
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i. Again, in the backyard I 
have no idea whether or not there was those materials, 
even though the ordinance does reference any open 
area. Because of physical limitations I could not see 
what was in the backyard. 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Provo 
City Code? 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Utah 
State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
A. Whether what? 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
A. Again, other than common sense of being able 
to identify whether an object is equipment or not, it 
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is a subject interpretation. 
Q. Is there open areas within the boundaries of 
this property? 
A. There is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in Provo 
City Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not it is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in Utah 
State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not it is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not ±z is. 
Q. Is the property exposed with an opaque or 
sight obscuring fence? 
A. Not to the extent that it would screen the 
materials from the public right-of-ways or adjacent 
lots. 
Q. Is the sight obscuring fence at least 
(inaudible) inches in height? 
A. I have not measured specifically how high 
the fence is. 
Q. If the area in question is behind the 
screening fence, is the area an open area in this lot? 
A. I guess anything is possible if we're 
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speaking about what-if's. In this specific situation 
it is not enclosed, it is an open area in the front 
yard. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether an area within a fence --
private yard is an open area? 
A. This ordinance says that the junk needs to 
be inside of a building, so anything that's not inside 
of a building would be an open area. 
Q. Has the defendant ever been charged with 
violations of Provo City Ordinances before now? 
MR. MCGINN: Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: When you first started 
working for the zoning department approximately 17 
months ago, were you handed an open file on Joan 
Patcon? 
A. I do not recall whether it was open or not. 
I was given the file, though. 
Q. Of which you have been in (inaudible) up 
through this 17 months? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you have any idea how old the fence is in 
question? 
A. The fence on the subject lot? 
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Q. Yes, sir. 
A. According to the information you gave me, it 
was in 1962 that it was put in, or there abouts. 
Q. Is the fence in question acting as an opaque 
or sight obscuring structure required by another Provo 
City Ordinance? 
A. The fence that is along the front property 
line of the property that you own with the residents 
on it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It would not serve the purpose of being 
opaque or screening to the extent the ordinance would 
require to screen an inoperable vehicle. 
Q. Have the Pattons' neighbors complained about 
the fence? 
A. I have not spoken to any of the neighbors 
regarding your property. 
Q. Does the fence pose a risk to health safety 
and welfare? 
A. This same fence that we're speaking about? 
Q. (Inaudible) utilizing the public streets and 
walks? 
A. In my opinion probably not. 
Q. Are certain neighbors in the city held to a 
higher zoning enforcement standards than others? 
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A. As zoning changes there are non-conforming 
rights that different property owners may have. In 
that situation, yes, some are held to a different 
standard than others. 
Q. Are there differences in policy and 
procedure from neighborhood to neighborhood 
(inaudible)? 
A. From zone to zone there are specific 
requirements. 
Q. Is this the only property charged with a 
violation in this neighborhood? 
A. With a violation in general or a specific 
violation? 
Q. I'm the only one that's on my street that's 
been charged with property violations? 
A. Period with any violation, that's what I'm 
asking, or specifically with this--
Q. For a zoning (inaudible). 
A. No, you are not. 
Q. How many are there on the street? Do you 
know? 
A. I would need to check my records to see 
historically what we have worked with since I have 
worked in the city. 
Q. Did (inaudible) of this property arise after 
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a citizen complaint? 
A. I had received and have received several 
calls from concerned residents in regards to your 
property. 
Q. And who would those residents be? 
A. I don't have that information in front of 
me. 
Q. But you do have it on file? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Was a charge levied against this property 
because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at 
the time prior to the charge? 
A. I cannot really answer that. When I started 
with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to 
investigate those, and one such case was your 
property. Because there had been previous work on it 
I did browse through the existing file, but did not 
use the material in there. I went out to the site and 
saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action 
as of that date in contacting you and requesting that 
the property be brought into compliance. 
MS. PATTON: I have no more questions for 
the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like 
to reserve the right to inquire the witness further. 
THE COURT: You may. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGINN: 
Q. Officer Malloy, forget about the trailer, 
forget about the trailer right now on this piece of 
property that we're talking about. Forget it's not 
there. On that day we're there, on March 19, 1996, 
was there scrap material, junk, garbage, trash in the 
front yard area constituting a violation? 
A. There were. 
Q. Is it possible that two different zoning 
officers could ever at one time go out to a piece of 
property and one officer miss a violation? 
A. I would say that would be unlikely, but it 
could happen. 
MR. MCGINN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May I see the exhibits, please? Do you have 
them right there? Thank you. 
Call your next witness, will you, please? 
MR. MCGINN: Mr. Roger Gonzalez. 
THE COURT: Before Mr. Gonzalez testifies, 
Mr. Schriner and Mr. Means? 
Ms. Patton, is there a problem? 
MS. PATTON: Yes, I object, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Object to what? 
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MS. PATT0N: I asked him discovery who the 
witnesses would be, and Mr. Malloy said that they had 
no witnesses, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let me address--
MS. PATTON: Mr. McGinn, pardon me. 
THE COURT: Let me address that in a minute. 
Why don't you have a seat. 
Before we call the next witness, the case 
that was on before you folks has been resolved for 
some time. I want to dispose of it now so that these 
folks can go on their way. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Thank you, folks, for the 
interruption. 
Now Mr. McGinn, you were calling another 
witness? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor, Roger 
Gonzalez, 
objection 
and 
THE 
I believe they were 
COURT: Ms. Patton, 
State your objection, 
MS. PATTON: 
that Mr. Gonzalez was 
objecting. 
you had an 
will you, please? 
I did not receive any 
going to be a witness, 
I have not had a chance to prepare. 
THE 
order that sai 
COURT: 
discovery 
therefore 
I didn't see any scheduling 
.d identification of witnesses. 
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Mr. McGinn? 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, if I could respond 
to that. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. j 
MR. MCGINN: Joan Patton has come into 
office several times. Our office has an open file 
policy. I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has | 
come in and asked for discovery. In our office if --
and to show them, in our file — if they come in we'll 
allow them to look at the file, or we just make copies 
of everything that's in the file. We give everybody 
everything, there should be no secrets, that's our 
office policy and that's what we do. 
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in 
i 
several times, we do have a cover sheet. It has a ? 
lisu of our officers that says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger 
Gonzalez from the zoning department." Anytime they 
come in and take a look that's there, and those are 
the orders that we give for them for people who--
THE COURT: When did the defendants first 
become aware of the name of Roger Gonzalez associated 
in this charge? 
MS. PATTON: Just now, your Honor. 
MR. HUMISTON: Your Honor, every document in 
this file was provided to me in discovery except the 
one that Mr. McGinn is referring to. This is the 
first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez. 
I appreciate they do have an open file 
policy and (inaudible) very generous, but this issue 
has come up and we also find out for the first time 
that there were neighbor complaints, which issue was 
specifically addressed at the time of pre-trial. So 
I'm getting the impression that the open file policy 
has been less than entirely open. 
MR. MCGINN: They've had access to 
everything I have and more. Joan's called me and 
asked me for --or Ms. Patton has called me and asked 
me for files that community development's had that 
I've not had in my possession, given those files to 
her, she's been free to go through it. 
THE COURT: Well, there's nothing contained 
in the files with respect to identification of 
witnesses on either side -- objection to witnesses 
identification or objection to exhibits. That means 
everything's been done informally. 
MS. PATTON: Can I be heard, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. PATTON: The motion for the bill of 
particulars, which we've had a hearing on, I did 
specifically at that time ask for a witness list and 
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1 have not to this date been given a witness list, your 
2 I Honor, and I do not dispute what Mr. Malloy has 
said -- or Mr. McGinn, I'm sorry. 
I did in fact see everything that was in 
that file except for the top page that I have just nov/ 
seen. 
MR. MCGINN: If I may approach just to show 
the Court--
THE COURT: Just a moment. Would you poin~ 
out for me, please, where in your bill of particulars 
you ask for identification of witnesses? 
MS. PATTON: I did it verbally, your Honor, 
before Judge Howard, in which I don't have a 
transcript. 
THE COURT: I have your bill of particulars 
and I have your memorandum in support of your bill of 
particulars, and there is nothing by way of any 
request for witnesses. I'm going to deny your 
objection. 
Mr. Gonzalez? 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
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ROGER GONZALEZ 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGINN: 
Q. Sir, would you please state your name for 
the record? 
A. Roger Gonzalez. 
Q. For whom do you work? 
A. I work for Provo City, code enforcement 
officer. 
Q. And how long have you done that? 
A. I have done that particular job for 
approximately 16 months. 
Q. Officer, I want to direct your attention to 
March 19, 1996. Did you accompany Anthony Malloy to 
1067 North 750 West on that day? 
A. I did. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. I was asked to go with him just to witness 
the violation, which he basically had been addressing. 
Q. And when you arrived at that address what 
did you do? 
A. I proceeded to take the camera and take some 
photographs of the purported violations. 
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Q. Officer, do you recognize these photos that 
have been entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 and 2? 
A. I do. 
Q. Did you take those? 
A. I did. 
Q. Does Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2 show in any 
detail the interior area of the Patton property? 
A. It does not, it shows only the trailer, 
which is in the driveway area. 
Q. Would you describe for the Court what types 
of materials you saw in the front yard area at this 
address on that date? 
A. I saw some debris of wood and lumber scraps 
that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the 
yard. I also saw some boxes --it looked like it 
contains either canned food or fruits and vegetables, 
that type of thing. I saw some cardboard paper, I saw 
some other materials that were enclosed in plastic 
bags . 
THE COURT: Were those items on the street 
side of the fence or the house side of the fence? 
THE WITNESS: They were on the house side of 
the fence. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: Were there additional items 
7 0 
i Q . 
! A. 
Q. 
Is this on the sidewalk? 
Yes. 1 
Adjacent to the property? 
A. Adjacent to the property in front of the 
property. 
Q. And how far away were you from the actual 
materials that you've just described? 
A. I was probably five, ten feet, not very far. 
Q. Were you able to see it clearly from the 
sidewalk? 
A. I was. 
MR. MCGINN: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, do you have any 
questions for him? 
MS. PATTON: In the interest of time, your 
Honor, because I was not aware and did not prepare for 
this, I'm going to ask Mr. Humiston to question 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, he's not going to question 
for both of you. 
MR. HUMISTON: I'm going to question him on 
behalf of Mr. Patton, but I guess she doesn't have any 
questions prepared because we did not know about this 
witness. 
THE COURT: I want the record to reflect 
that. 
Ms. Patton, you don't have any questions of 
this witness at this time; is that correct? 
MS. PATTON: Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Humiston, your witness, sir 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUMISTON: 
Q. Mr. Gonzalez, did you view the property at 
any other time other than March 19, 1996? 
A. I have viewed the property only as I've 
driven by on other occasions, but not from the 
distance. 
Q. So as far as the materials in the yard thac 
you've just described, did you see them at any other 
time other than March 19, 1996? 
A. No, I have not been there since. 
Q. So you have no evidence as far as how long 
the materials (inaudible) or whether they're still 
there? 
A. I don't. I was there this morning and just 
to -- no, not this morning -- well, in answer to your 
question, no. 
Q. So as far as the materials you saw on March 
19, 1996 you indicated that there v/as scrap lumber. 
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THE COURT: 
that. 
Ms. Patton, 
this witness at this 
MS. PATTON: 
I want the record to reflect 
you don't have any questions of 
time; is that correct? 
Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Humiston, your witness, sir 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUMISTON: 
Q. Mr. Gonzalez, did you view the property at 
any other time other than March 19, 1996? 
A. I have viewed the property only as I've 
driven by on other occasions, but not from the 
distance. 
Q. So as far as the materials in the yard thac 
you've just described, did you see them at any other 
time other than March 19, 1996? 
A. No, I have not been there since. 
Q. So you have no evidence as far as how long 
the materials (inaudible) or whether they're still 
there? 
A. I don't. I was there this morning and just 
co -- no, not this morning -- well, in answer to your 
question, no. 
Q. So as far as the materials you saw on March 
19, 1996 you indicated that there v/as scrap lumber. 
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see it? 
MR. HUMISTON: Yes. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence) 
THE COURT: Mr. Humiston, anything else from 
you, sir? 
MR. HUMISTON: No further evidence, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Is Mr. Patton going no testify? 
MR. HUMISTON: He is not. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Does the City want to be heard? 
MR. MCGINN: Closing arguments, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir, closing arguments, 
we're now in that posture. 
MR. MCGINN: Thank you. Your Honor, there 
has been much made of discrimination, singling out the 
Pattons. There's no evidence of that. Anthony Malloy 
testified that there are several violations in that 
area that they are working on, he didn't have his 
notes to tell them how many other violations are in 
the neighborhood. Nobody's targeting the Pattons. 
Officer Malloy, Officer Gonzalez went out to 
the property, saw on March 19, 1996 that there was 
garbage, junk, materials in the -- may I approach, 
your Honor, they are right there. 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCGINN: They testified that from that 
photo you can't see clearly the interior of the yard, 
but Mr. Gonzalez was clear in that he stood on the 
sidewalk, looked in the yard, and described the types 
of materials; lumber that was in various bits and 
pieces, food upon the ground that were not covered, 
there was some questions alluding to the fact that 
this could have been firewood, but it was not kept --
there is no evidence that it was kept in any sort of 
manner, there is no evidence that it was used as 
firewood. There was boxes, bags strewn across the 
front yard. 
They are clearly in violation. When there's 
a violation that needs to be addressed. If the 
property gets cleaned up and in five months there's 
another violation, that violation needs to be 
addressed. 
We think the evidence that has been 
presented to the Court is clear. There's only been 
three witnesses, both Officers Malloy and Gonzalez 
testified that the yard in question did have junk, 
garbage, material, trash. 
Mr. Keller for the defense testified --he 
testified that the whole neighborhood -- he testified 
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Subjective to termination, your Honor, terms and 
ordinances have their plain and ordinary meaning, and 
I understand that some people may consider one man's 
garbage is another man's treasure. But in this case 
the evidence was clear there were wood strewn about 
the lawn with -- uncovered that had been weathered, 
there were paper or cartons -- cardboard cartons thac 
were overflowing, splitting, had been left out in the 
weather, were in a weathered condition. 
I think this clearly under the plain and 
ordinary words used in the ordinance, 14-34-08 0, are 
trash, junk, materials that are clearly in the area. 
As far as any intent, the officer indicated 
that he sent a letter indicating that there was a 
violation, the letter came back from Ms. Patton 
indicating that she didn't think there was a 
violation. 
As to the meaning of the vehicle, whether 
11^  
1 this trailer is junk, operational, the statute that 
2 was cited and read by Anthony Malloy --by Joan Patton 
3 and read by Anthony Malloy, 41-1A-1008, deals with 
4 salvaged titles and selling inoperable vehicles for 
5 scrap. It has nothing to do with whether a vehicle is 
6 inoperable or abandoned in dealing with zoning, 
7 because it's salvaged titles. 
8 And whether the Court considers the 
9 vehicle -- the trailer, I think that's really 
10 irrelevant, because not looking at the trailer, 
11 there's certainly sufficient testimony offered by two 
12 witnesses that is unrebutted by anybody that there was 
13 junk and materials that would fit the plain and 
14 ordinary meaning of 14-34-080. 
15 Submit it on that to the Court. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. From the testimony 
17 provided, and from the exhibits that have been 
18 received, I have difficulty in being able to determine 
19 I that the first part of Count I of an unlicensed motor 
20 vehicle, a wrecked, junked or partially dismantled or 
21 inoperative or abandoned motor vehicle was present on 
22 the defendant's property. 
23 Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 are really of 
24 not much assistance to me to make any determination as 
25 to whether the yard is in compliance or it's not. 
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All those photographs really show is a 
residence with a bunch of material out in front and a 
parked trailer. 
Mr. Malloy testified that he didn't remember 
if the trailer had flat tires on it on March 19th or 
not, and he said he had no evidence of whether che 
trailer was registered or whether it wasn't. 
The second portion of the City's charging 
offense contained in Count: I is the defendant, also 
during the time in question, stored crash, used 
materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, 
scrap materials, equipment or parts thereof in an open 
area not screened from the public streets and adjacent 
properties by an opaque wall or fence. 
In reading the statute and hearing the 
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and Mr. 
Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and the 
testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather 
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants' 
property complied in making it appear to be the same 
as the neighborhood in question, I find that the City 
has met its burden of proof concerning the second 
portion of that charging information in Count I, 
therefore I find the defendants guilty as charged. 
From the plain and simple meaning of the 
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ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, folks, I 
believe that the evidence has sufficiently 
demonstrated that there are items which consist of 
junk, stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated 
cardboard boxes, and even potential food products that 
looked like they had gone bad, from the witness' 
testimony. 
And with that testimony being the only 
testimony on the record, with nothing else to rebut it 
or to describe what it was, then the Court has only 
one conclusion to draw, and that is is it believable 
or is it not, and I find that the City has met its 
proof with respect to belief. 
The questions that came from the defendant, 
Mrs. Patton, was it possible for these things to be 
something else. I guess it's possible that Haley Bob 
comet had a spaceship behind it. Probable? Probably 
not. It's possible that all of these things were 
meant for the burning of firewood? Possible. But 
from the testimony I have on the record, and I have to 
make a finding from the testimony, it's probable thac 
it was not firewood. So I find the defendants guilty 
as charged in Count I. 
What's your pleasure with respect to 
sentencing? You may be sentenced today on each of 
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Now Mr. Humiston, you had something to say? 
MR. HUMISTON: Well, your Honor, you 
addressed my objection in advance. I certainly 
strenuously object to any reference to the other lot 
in relation to sentencing on this lot. Certainly, as 
far as it's relevant, if the State is anticipating 
another prosecution, we're back to square 1, we will 
bring all the objections based en constitutionality 
and various other motions. 
But I certainly -- I agree with the Court, I 
think you addressed our objection already that any 
sentencing with this lot has to pertain strictly with 
this lot. 
THE COURT: I have no problem if Mr. Malloy 
and the Pattons with you, sir, want to meet and 
discuss what, if anything, needs to be done to bring 
1067 North 750 West into compliance, and then make 
recommendations at the time of sentencing concerning 
that issue. I'd be happy to hear those from both 
sides, but that's where we're going to restrict 
ourselves. 
MR. HUMISTON: If I respond, your Honor, 
just to review what we've done here today, Count II 
was dismissed and Count I, the finding was based on 
trash that was illegally in the yard on March 19th. 
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THE COURT: I found a violation of Count I. 
MR. HUMIST0N: Right. 
THE COURT: The violation is based upon the 
trash that was found in the front yard, as you've 
phrased it. 
MR. HUMISTON: And so I understand that 
when we, at the first sentencing, sentencing will 
pertain to the issues as found in Court's finding, 
specifically trash in the yard; is that correct? 
THE COURT: My sentence will pertain to the 
fact that the property is out of compliance with the 
zoning because of the material that has been testified 
to as being in the yard. 
MR. HUMISTON: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: There is nothing in the street 
that I have found at this time that is out of 
compliance with the ordinance. 
MR. HUMISTON: I think we can go ahead and 
schedule the sentencing. 
COURT CLERK: We can set it on June 11th at 
9 o'clock. 
THE COURT: Is June 11th at 9 a.m. 
acceptable to you, Mrs. Patton? 
MS. PATTON: Your Honor, can we extend it 
just about another week? I have a woman whose baby is 
1 MS. PATTON: I did, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Do you want to comment with 
3 regard to this request? 
4 MS. PATTON: I would, your Honor. 
5 I THE COURT: Go ahead. 
6 MS. PATTON: As the Court pointed out, the 
7 entire discovery process has been handled very 
8 informally. In the memorandum that Mr. Malloy sent to 
9 Mr. McGinn, he states that he took the pictures that 
10 were entered in as evidence. This is the same 
11 memorandum that mentions that Roger Gonzalez was 
12 I another zoning officer. 
13 Mr. Romney was the attorney from Provo City 
14 at my arraignment. He states on the court record that 
15 I will be given "everything that we have" from my 
16 verbal discovery request to the Court at the time from 
17 this statement. I conclude that the terms "everything 
18 I in evidence, witness lists, complaints, et cetera." 
19 At the pre-trial conference Mr. Malloy was 
20 I present, Mr. McGinn was present, I was there, Natalie 
21 J Zabriskie, Michael Humiston was also present. Mr. 
22 Gonzalez was not present. At this conference I was 
23 asked -- I asked who the complainants were, who the 
24 witnesses were, and Mr. Malloy informed me that there 
25 were no complainants, that he was the only one, that 
this case originated because of an open file that he 
had been given when he first started working for Provo 
City. 
Let me emphasize that Mr. Gonzalez was not 
present, nor was his name even mentioned. Mr. Malloy 
further lead me to believe that the pictures that were 
in the file were taken by him. 
On three separate occasions I scheduled 
appointments with Mr. Malloy to come out to the 
property and tell me what the problems were. Each 
time Mr. Malloy arrived he came with another person, 
an intern named Bryce. 
At none of these meetings was Mr. Gonzalez 
mentioned. He was not present, and I was further lead 
co believe that Mr. Malloy had taken all the pictures 
and was the only zoning officer involved in this case. 
Accordingly I prepared my defense based on 
the City only using the items they had showed me as 
evidence, as Mr. Malloy as the sole witness. From the 
record of the trial is this evident that I had that 
had che trial proceeded I was lead to believe that it 
would, the outcome would have been completely 
different. 
It is obvious that the only testimony that 
allowed for the conviction was the testimony of Mr. 
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Gonzalez, and like Mr . Malloy, i 
cross exam questions for, I had 
opportunity to prepare any type 
Gonzalez. 
Gonzalez, 
witness, 
Had I known about the 
tfho had I prepared 
absolutely no time or 
of cross 
admission 
the admission of the additional 
I could have 
By the Court allowing 
prepared j 
testimony 
exam of Mr. 
of Mr. 
surprise 
for this eventuality. 
from this surprise 
witness, my case was unduly prejudiced, I was denied 
due process, I was not given the opportunity to face 
and cross question my accusers as guaranteed by this 
judicial system. The principle of fundamental 
fairness was compromised, and I did noc get a fair 
trial. 
I personally did not feel that this one 
admission was done deliberately or maliciously, nor do 
I believe that the oversight was intention on the part 
of the Provo City prosecutor. However, in the 
interest of fundamental fairness, due process, and 
opportunity to defend against accusers, I would ask 
that this Court grant this motion for the arrest of 
judgment at this time. 
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, 
Counsel? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor. I believe 
